Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment: What Chatrie v. United States Means for Law Enforcement

April 29, 2026 00:39:49
Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment: What Chatrie v. United States Means for Law Enforcement
Guardian Mindset Podcast
Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment: What Chatrie v. United States Means for Law Enforcement

Apr 29 2026 | 00:39:49

/

Show Notes

Chatrie v. United States Key Takwaways:

For law enforcement, the practical takeaway is clear: avoid broad digital searches, work closely with prosecutors, document the investigative need, and make every warrant as particularized as possible.

Ongoing education is essential. Agencies need to stay ahead of emerging technology, changing court standards, and the legal risks tied to digital evidence collection. Learn more at DLGLearningCenter.com.

Geofence Warrants and Fourth Amendment Tensions

This episode focuses on Chatrie v. United States, a major geofence warrant case involving Google location data, digital privacy, and the Fourth Amendment. The case began with a bank robbery investigation where a detective obtained a geofence warrant for Google location data within a defined area around the crime scene. That data eventually helped identify the suspect.

The legal issue is whether the government can collect location data from multiple users within a geofence and then narrow the results later. That question creates a major Fourth Amendment concern: does this type of warrant allow the government to search first and justify later?

The episode explains why geofence warrants create tension between investigative needs and constitutional protections. Even when the government obtains a warrant, the warrant must still satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity. The concern is that a geofence warrant may sweep in data from people who were merely near a crime but had no connection to it.

Foundational Doctrines and Modern Technology

The episode walks through the major Supreme Court cases shaping this issue, including United States v. Miller, Smith v. Maryland, and Carpenter v. United States.

Miller and Smith form the foundation of the Third-Party Doctrine. Under that doctrine, information voluntarily shared with a third party, such as a bank or telephone company, may lose Fourth Amendment protection. The government argues that Google location data falls into that same category because users voluntarily share location information with Google.

But Carpenter complicates that analysis. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court recognized that modern cell phone location data can reveal deeply personal details about a person’s life and movements. The Court required stronger Fourth Amendment protection for historical cell-site location information.

That creates the central conflict in Chatire: should geofence location data be treated like ordinary third-party business records, or should it receive stronger privacy protection because of how revealing modern digital tracking can be?

Judicial Perspectives and Implications

The Supreme Court’s review of Chatrie highlights how unsettled this area of law remains. The justices appeared divided on questions of voluntariness, privacy, property rights, public movements, and the limits of digital surveillance.

Some justices focused on whether users can simply turn location tracking off, suggesting an assumption-of-risk theory. Others emphasized that cell phones can reveal deeply personal patterns of life, even when movements occur in public. The discussion also raised concerns about whether geofence warrants resemble general warrants because they allow the government to collect data from many people before identifying a suspect.

The case may become one of the most important technology-and-privacy decisions since Carpenter. It could define how courts evaluate geofence warrants, cloud-stored data, and other digital investigative tools going forward.

Practical Outlook for Law Enforcement

For law enforcement, the practical takeaway is to prepare for stricter scrutiny. Even if geofence warrants survive constitutional review, courts may demand more precise applications.

Agencies should expect to see greater emphasis on narrow geographic boundaries, limited time windows, clear probable cause, individualized suspicion where possible, and minimization procedures that reduce unnecessary exposure of unrelated users’ data.

Investigators should also work closely with prosecutors before seeking geofence warrants or similar digital search tools. Documentation matters. The more clearly the warrant explains the connection between the crime, the location, the timeframe, and the data sought, the stronger the application will be.

This episode reinforces a larger point: technology will continue to move faster than the law. Law enforcement agencies must stay educated, adapt their practices, and understand that courts are increasingly concerned with digital overbreadth, mass surveillance, and the privacy implications of modern investigative tools.

Chapters

View Full Transcript

Episode Transcript

[00:00:00] Hello everybody, and welcome back to the next episode of the Guardian Mindset Podcast. I'm attorney Eric Daigle. I'm happy to be your host here today, especially on a topic that I'm very, very fond of because it's a very hot button item that we're going to be talking about forever and ever. And that's the world of technology and the advancement of technology. And most importantly, the thing that I'm going to focus on is how technology and law have just not been hand in hand. [00:00:27] In fact, one of the challenges that we're going to focus on and something that is a direct application of our DLG Technology Summit, which you can find online at dlgtechnologysummit.com is our three day virtual training program. In August of this year, we're going to talk about these issues and boy, the court's giving me a lot to talk about and things that I need to get in front of you quickly and make sure that gives you some things to think about. You listen to this point, we've talked about things like artificial intelligence, we've talked about image recognition, we've talked about the challenges of facial recognition. [00:01:03] And in our continuous training programs, we talk about how the advancement of technology is moving forward so fast and the law just isn't keeping up. And that's my biggest problem. The law is not keeping up. And so today we're going to talk about that and even the court's going to focus on it because we're going to look at a Supreme Court preview, Shatray versus United States. That's C H A T R I E and it's a 4th Circuit Court of Appeals case which actually went to the Supreme Court today for oral argument, which we're going to talk about because I got to put this on everybody's radar because I'll be teaching it for a while now, I'm sure. [00:01:39] If you've heard me talk about technology. One of the things I continue to reference back to is the fact that the Supreme Court has not really addressed technology since 2017. [00:01:50] While there's only a handful of very important basic foundational level of cases that we've dealt with in the Supreme Court dealing with technology. You know, we've dealt with the aspect of the latest decision, 2017, which is the Carpenter decision, which we'll talk about again today in this case review because the court's going to bring it up. We also talk about the Jones case, which is the GPS case from the District of Columbia in 2012, and the placement of a GPS transponder on Mr. Jones Joan's car and how that was a trespass under the fourth Amendment. And then we have the Riley and The Worry Case 2015, which are the cell phone interpretations in which, you know, we're all very much affiliate familiar with the fact the Supreme Court just said, hey, get a warrant, get a warrant, get a warrant. And, and that just shows some of the concerns that the Supreme Court is articulating in these areas. [00:02:45] So today, as I just finished listening and now doing the podcast, the Supreme Court did a purview on a new case that what I want to talk about. So let me lay it out to you for a second. First, we're going to start with a summary of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals case from 2024. And the facts of this case are very simple. During the investigation of a bank robbery, a detective reviewed surveillance footage which appeared to show a robber holding a cell phone when he walked into the bank. So knowing that Google possesses location data on millions of cell phones, the detective applied for and obtained a warrant seeking information from Google about all cell phones within a certain radius of the bank, a perimeter known as a geofence around the time of the crime. And as you know, the application of a geofence is to drop a circle around the location of of the crime in order to pull out data from that information. And that's exactly what the court is focused on here. [00:03:52] A geo warrant was signed by the court and Google complied with the geo warrant. Though three separate requests to Google, the government ultimately obtained geolocation data that enabled it to identify Shot Tree as the suspect who was charged with two crimes related to bank robbery. [00:04:11] After his arrest, Chatri, who had opted to share his location history with Google, moved to suppress the location information, arguing that the geofence warrant violated his fourth Amendment. And for those of you that are like me, that are still trying to catch up on this technology application, we call it the old guy syndrome. The aspect here is that there is an option in the Google data that you can, you can decide to opt in or opt out to share your location with Google. Mr. Chatri had opted in to share his location and therefore that was available when the JIO warrant was exercised and Google responded to it. [00:04:54] So his argument is that the geofence warrant violated the fourth Amendment. The district court declined to decide whether Chatri had a reasonable expectation of privacy and the data sought by the warrant instead of the court held that the warrant violated the fourth amendment because the geofence warrant failed to establish particularized probable cause to Search every Google user within the geofence. Now think about that for a second. You know, we know that the application of a warrant and we know that lately we've been talking about cell phone cases in the interpretation of cell phone cases, becoming a little more stricter in the fact that for a long period of time you could get a search warrant for a cell phone and that search warrant in and of itself would give you full access to the cell phone. We now have seen recently under Fourth Amendment interpretation, that court of appeals cases have started to limit that a what the court loves to call a rummaging application. You know, when, when dealing with technology, the court loves to use two words when it comes to cops, and that is rummaging and hoarding. Think about that for a second. Rummaging and hoarding. Yeah, yeah. [00:06:02] Cops rummage through people's things and when we get data, oftentimes the area of a hoarding application, and that's one of the things that is indirect. An issue in this case is they're worried about the hoarding application. [00:06:18] Nonetheless, the court declined to suppress the geofence evidence, holding that the good faith exception applied because of a few different things, actually four in which they identified one. Before applying for the warrant, the detective consulted with government attorneys in the face of this rapidly advancing technology, which by the way, isn't a very important part of the fact here, which is, you know, we got to keep up to date with the fact that this stuff is progressing and that one of the people, one of the entities that we do need to keep in fact with, in touch with would be your prosecutors, your district attorneys, because they have the ultimate application to defend or to address these issue. [00:06:58] Number two, a lack of judicial guidance on this novel investigative technique. They're using very fancy language. Can you tell? Number three, the detective had obtained similar geofence warrants in the past. And number four, the warrant was not otherwise facially deficient. On appeal, a three judge panel of the fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and a two to one opinion affirmed the district court. [00:07:23] So the issue on the table here, which we're going to start to dive into, and I don't want to confuse you too much, but I want to lay it out to you to get your, to start getting your mind to think about the issues of this technology that we're dealing with so much now in all sorts of data application, but I think it's going to start talking about the application. So in this court of appeals case, the majority relied on what they call the third party doctrine outlined by the Supreme Court in two cases which I'm going to touch on quickly. United States vs. Miller Smith vs. Maryland, and not the good faith exception. So they worried about the third party doctrine and not the good faith exception. The majority held that the government did not conduct a search under the fourth amendment when it obtained two hours worth of Chatri's location information since he voluntarily exposed the information to a third party, which in this case was Google. So push pause on that for a second. And let's talk about a very simple concept of the cases that are being relied upon in this application in the ad. So we're at the Supreme Court level now. I'm sorry, we're. We're at the court of appeals level now, and they're referencing two cases. The first one is going to be United States versus Miller with it's a 1976 Supreme Court decision where the supreme court held that bank records obtained by the government through subpoenas did not implicate the fourth amendment because they are not the private papers of individuals, but rather business records of the bank. The court concluded that a bank customer has no legitimate expectation of privacy and financial information voluntarily conveyed to a bank and exposed to its employees in the ordinary course of business. Now again, I'm going over these cases to set a foundational application here in The United States vs. Miller. The case arose when federal agents investigating illegal distilling operations issued subpoenas to two banks seeking Miller's financial records, including checks, deposit slips and account statements. The bank complied and provided the record without a warrant. Miller moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the records were obtained in violation of his fourth amendment right. While the court of Appeals agreed with Miller, the supreme Court reversed, holding that the records were lawfully obtained. So let's take a Look at the Fourth Amendment analysis. In United States vs. Miller, 1976, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons own private papers and effects, not information held by third parties. Because the documents sought were created and maintained by the banks for their own business purposes, they did not belong to Miller in a constitutional sense. The court emphasized that the information contained in the records were voluntarily conveyed by Miller to the banks as part of the routine financial transactions. So out of this in 1976, we have the third party doctrine. [00:10:24] This case is the cornerstone of the third party doctrine. Reinforcing the principle that information voluntarily shared with a third party loses fourth amendment protection, the court held that when an individual reveals information to a bank, they assume the risk that information will be Disclosed to the government. Even if the information is sensitive, the act of sharing it with a third party eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy. [00:10:50] That brings us to the second case that the appellate court looked at here, Also a Supreme court case, Smith vs. Maryland in 1979. In 1979, the United States Supreme Court in Smith vs. Maryland held that the installation or the use of a pen register. And for those of you that don't know this, that's a device that records numbers dialed from a phone. Kind of saw that on in Baltimore in the application of the wire. For those of you my favorite show, love that show. [00:11:21] I don't even think Department of Justice went to Baltimore. I think they just watched the wire. [00:11:25] So a device that records numbers dialed from a telephone does not constitute a search under the fourth Amendment. As a result, law enforcement does not need a warrant to obtain this type of dialing information. The court concluded that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial because that information is voluntarily conveyed to the telephone company. So this factual background of Smith vs. Maryland, 1979. I've been using this case for a long time in fourth Amendment application. The case arose after a robbery victim began receiving threatening phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. Police traced the suspect back to Michael Lee Smith after observing a vehicle matching the victim's description. [00:12:11] Without obtaining a warrant, Officers asked the telephone company to install a pen register at its central office to record numbers dialed from Smith's home phone. The device showed a call to the victim, which helped establish probable cause for a search warrant of Smith's residence, ultimately leading to his arrest and conviction. In the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court applied the two part test. As you know, Katz v. Saucy of the Telephone Booth Case, 1967, in determining whether a search occurred, one, whether the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and number two, whether that expectation is one the society recognizes reasonable. The court found that even if Smith subjectively expected privacy in the numbers he dialed, that expectation was not objectively reasonable. Telephone users knowingly transmit dialed numbers to the phone company, which routinely records such information for business purposes, or at least did when we used to have telephones in our houses, right? So now we go back to the third party doctrine. Again. [00:13:14] A key component of the decision is the development of the third party doctrine. The court held that when an individual voluntarily conveys information to a third party, in this case the telephone company, they assume the risk that information could be disclosed to law enforcement because the telephone company had access to the dialed Number Smith could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy to that application. So what we know about Smith vs. Maryland, which is a very important case, it establishes a fundamental principle in Fourth Amendment law that information voluntarily shared with a third party is generally not protected by the Fourth Amendment. This doctrine has had far reaching implications, particularly in modern digital privacy cases, as you would expect, where courts must determine whether and how this principle applies to the evolving technology such as cell phone data sites, Internet records and geolocation tracking. So let's go back now to United States Supreme Court Preview Shatri versus United States and let's continue where the Court left off. Remember, the reason why I read to you The United States vs. Miller Smith vs. Maryland is because the majority of the court in this case relied on the third party doctrine, which basically said, hey, when you voluntarily expose information to a third party, then you have no expectation of privacy. And the allegation here is that's what Mr. Chatri did. He exposed his information to Google, therefore he has no, no expectation of privacy. The dissenting judge wrote in his opinion that the Court's holding of Miller and Smith did not apply in this case because the supreme court in Carpenter vs United States was rejected. A simplistic analogy to which those cases, when dealing with advanced digital surveillance. Carpenter has long said a lot of very significant things. And one of the areas that we need to pay attention to is that the last time the Supreme Court looked at technology under the Fourth Amendment was geolocation data or what you all now know as CSLI information. [00:15:27] And the reality and the question that was part of the analysis there was do we need probable cause showing in a warrant to get geolocation data? And the court came back and said, yes, it is the tracking of American people. Well, let me hold on for a second. Let's, let's just think about that for a second. And by the way, that's the last time the Supreme Court has looked at this issue. So in Carpenter, the court held that a police intrusion into seven days of the defendant's historical cell site location information, which is the csli, or that what we call the geolocation data produced two days worth of data, constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Even if, even if such analogy was proper. And by the key way, the key part to this analysis is that it said that, that it was a search that needed a probable cause basis. So the, basically the, the issue in the Carpenter case was whether or not a one sided, a single sided, what most states call an ex parte warrant was necessary in order to achieve this application, the court said, no, no, no, no, no. You need probable cause when you're starting to track people. [00:16:41] And so the application is. The judge found that the nature of the records collected in this case, csli, could not be compared to the records collected in Miller and Smith. So. So now they're going to take a second, and they're going to analyze and evaluate Miller and Smith in that process. So stay with me here. This is where the court is saying, okay, we have Carpenter, who says probable cause to obtain that information. We have Miller and Smith. And where the Supreme Court has said, you reveal that information to a third party, it's open. [00:17:16] The court said. In Miller, the court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records the government obtained through the use of a grand jury subpoena served on the bank. We know that in Smith, the court held that the defendant didn't have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed that the government obtained after the warrantless installation of a pen registry. Relying on the court's opinion in Carpenter, the judge concluded. This is the dissenting judge now in the 4th Circuit. The judge concluded that the government engaged in a Fourth amendment search when they obtained Chatri's location history data. [00:17:55] Subsequently, a majority of the judges in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the panel's opinion and voted to grant a rehearing in front of the 4th. The entire 4th Circuit. Now, that's called of. [00:18:07] That's called sitting en banc for those of you that don't know this. And what happens is, even before you go to the Supreme Court, at the appellate level, you can be in front of three judges, and then you can request all 15 judges to be involved. And that's what happened here. They requested an en banc hearing, and they got all 15 judges. In April of 2025, the en banc affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Shotgun's motion to suppress the geofence evidence. [00:18:36] Although the court denied Chatri's motions, the judges were divided over the application of the Fourth Amendment to geofence warrants. [00:18:45] What was amazing in this case and why I'm kind of looking forward to what's going to break. Not that you all are getting as excited as I am about this, but this is, I guess, my job. The judges wrote nine separate opinions, no single one which received a majority vote. Seven judges concluded that geofence warrants constitute a Fourth amendment search, while seven judges disagreed and concluded that they did not. I guess this is what we call a Conflict, Right. And one judge declined to decide the issue at all. This guy just said deuces, I'm not even doing it. The fourth Circuit's decision in Saatchi was so conflicted with the United States versus Smith in which a unanimous three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit held that geofence warrants violates the Fourth Amendment in 2024. [00:19:32] So the, what they're talking about here before we go to the Supreme Court is that there was a prior case called the state versus Smith and decision out of the fifth Circuit when where the fifth Circuit already said that a geolocation, the geolocation warrant violated. [00:19:52] Violated the fourth Amendment. A very unique single application that just stood out by itself. We've all just been looking at it for the past two years going, not sure what to do with this. [00:20:02] We talked about it in training. But the fifth Circuit's reasoning in Smith was subsequently rejected by the Texas Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court. So do we have an issue? Oh yeah, we got an issue and it's going to go to the supreme court. So on January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiori to agree to hear the case in the issue before the court. Very simply, very straightforward. The issue before the court is whether the execution of a geo offense warrant violated the fourth Amendment. The court was scheduled to hear oral argument in this case on April 27, 2026 and did so. So I want to take a second and I'm going to suggest if you get an opportunity on top of this, if you're, if you're eager to learn more, you could obviously google the Chatri case and you could, you could listen to the two hour oral argument in this case. But we're going to go through this just to give you some highlights of things that we, you know, you kind of get a feeling for where they're going. But in this case, I got to be honest with you, the, the judges were all over the place. Now I don't know whether it's because the judges are old, I don't know whether the judges are confused. I don't know whether we have a conflict between liberal or conservative judges, but this is something that we're going to pay attention to. So right off the bat we're going to focus on the petitioner's argument in this case. And in their argument was that Geoffense warrants equal general warrants. And, and basically their argument was the government effectively searched everyone's data first, then narrows the suspects later. [00:21:45] This resembles a prohibited general warrant because it lacked individual probable cause and it authorized searching every single person's account within the geofence. So one of the things that was initially argued by the petitioner is that searching all accounts to find a suspect flipped the fourth amendment on its head. So the court says there's two compelling theories of protection. The first is a property based theory. Users have a property interest in cloud stored data, a right to exclude, a right to control and a right to delete. In fact, interestingly, what the Supreme Court was, what was discussed in the oral arguments is that Google accounts are like virtual safety deposit boxes where you can hold and protect all of your items. Now we also have to look at the privacy based theory, which is a long history of Cats from 1967 and Carpenter from 2017. And what the court looked at was location history is highly revealing, right. [00:22:52] And really gets back into the issue of tracking of American citizens, which is an argument that was made oftentimes by the ACLU and the analysis of that this data in its container application, this data is stored in password protected accounts. So basically what they're arguing is that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. It meets the two part test, a subjective application and would the country find it reasonable. [00:23:30] So the third part they talked about was anonymity. [00:23:34] And does that save the search? [00:23:37] The fact that you're really not searching people but you're searching data and even though the data is anonymous, a search is still a search even if the identity is unknown and movement patterns can easily re identify individuals. So the way the court said it, breaking into a safety deposit box is still a search even if you don't know whose box it is. It's a fair application voluntariness as we expected, the in this case voluntary or allowing opt in was argued in this case and it appears that the voluntary was rejected. The government claims that the user opted in and that means that the user opted into allowing Google to have their data. So therefore there was no fourth amendment protection. [00:24:31] The petitioner's response here was that this logic would eliminate privacy for everything. In fact, they were a little dramatic in their aspect. They said this logic would eliminate privacy for email, for documents, for photos. Voluntary storage does not equal consent by a government to a government search. And so they're alleging that the opt in application of voluntariness argument is, is the basis for the government and the respondent doesn't agree. So then they get into particularity and probably cause problems. In the oral argument they discussed that even if it's not a general Warren, there There is no probable cause for all the people that the geofence warrant identified. This is a pretty interesting analysis here, meaning that the geofence warrant gives identity numbers in serial application, though they don't identify by people, but by application. And then you have to go in and get another warrant to identify the person. But the question here is, under our theory of fourth amendment application, our search warrants as outlined by the fourth Amendment are supposed to be particular and they're supposed to outline probable cause. So the, their argument was that there was no probable cause for all 19 individuals in the geofence, and the mere proximity to a crime does not equal justification to search personal data. So as you know, as we talked about, the geofence warrant is just a drop. It's like putting a big bowl over the area in finding out who is around the area where the crime occurs. The key line in the oral argument that you will hear is that the court said being near a crime does not justify searching your digital diary. Touche. And then finally, the, the go to argument that is getting a lot of attention nowadays is mass surveillance capability concerns. And the respondent in their analysis is going to, is going to focus on that. This is a continuation of mass surveillance. [00:26:51] Unlike traditional surveillance where you can sit in your car or you can sit on a camera and watch something, the go warrant allows you to look back in time and you can track everyone, not just suspects. So this is a qualitative leap beyond prior police capabilities. Right. [00:27:13] It's not traditional surveillance. [00:27:16] So the government then went up and the government themes were very simple. [00:27:22] The oral argument identified that the Justices had. They were provided by the government three key counterparts. Number one, voluntary disclosure, which we talked about, user opted in shared data with Google and therefore reduced the expectation of privacy. [00:27:41] Number two, public argument movements occurred in a public place traditionally not protected under the fourth Amendment. Sidewalks, streets, locations. We're not talking about inside a house or in a private area. And then the narrow scope of the warrant was limited by both time and geography. So it's not this, it's. It's not this fishing expedition that they use often in the legal analysis. It was not a general warrant in historical census. [00:28:08] So what did I take away from the oral argument? Well, there was some, there were some key moments that the Justices identified. And while we never know how the outcome is going to turn out, we can, I like to pay attention to some of the key areas that the Justices highlight because we know which justices are going to be on each side of this. So the first was, was chief Justice Roberts and he was very skeptical of the privacy claim. [00:28:36] He basically said you can just turn the location history off, right? [00:28:41] And to me that signals, for whatever it's worth, openness to voluntariness and assumption of risk theory. [00:28:50] Justice Sotomayor, which we know is going to be on the more on the liberal side, she was very focused on strong privacy concerns. She emphasized that phones reveal deeply personal life patterns and time limits don't reduce privacy intrusions. [00:29:09] She suggests alignment with the Carpenter style reasoning. And that's not surprising in, in, in response from Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan focused on whether numbers matter and whether what he was. I think what he was mean by that was he was asking questions about how many users opt in and the limits to voluntariness. Do people know about it? Can they do it? Do they do it? In that analysis, Justice Gorsch, interested in property based framework, highlighted implications for email and all cloud storage data, was very concerned about how this would express out. [00:29:51] Justice Barrett expressed concern about complexity of property theory based on the assumption and my interpretation lean towards reasonable expectation of privacy test, which is was there an expectation of privacy in that analysis. [00:30:09] Justice Alito highly skeptical. He questioned why the ca. The court even took the case at all. [00:30:16] And this is not surprising in the aspect where do we want to go down this. This road. And we'll talk about the road in a second here. But he emphasized, hey, good faith exception in narrow factual context. We're not, we're looking at a very narrow area, a narrow period of time, a narrow analysis. And then Justice Jackson said, hey, the circuit split on this seven. Seven. [00:30:47] Maybe that's a sign that we should be paying attention to. [00:30:51] So what are we really going to be looking for as we move forward here? And I'll get down to the bottom line and the practical law enforcement takeaways, but let me just kind of wrap this all up for you. So we definitely are looking at doctrinal tensions, major doctrinal tensions on the Carpenter extension. Does Carpenter vs United States extend to voluntarily enabled location history and does it extend to short time windows? And I always like to remind everybody in 2017 where the question with Carpenter was do we need probable cause to search geolocation data on a person's cell phone? The answer was yes. But the Supreme Court did say and did start to separate out two things which I pay attention to in our analysis. Number one, it was focused on separating out the differences between communication and content. Now think about that for a second. Communication was the business records. And we see that in the four circuits analysis of Miller and the four circuits analysis of Smith versus Maryland and where the court's looking at these as business records, right? [00:32:12] And the communication of under Carpenter, the communication of, of what towers your cell phone connected to, those are business records. And for those of you that involved in lawyering, you know that a business record is limited hearsay, exception. And in the aspect that business records and kept in the ordinary course of business, you know, are often turned over with limited evidentiary issues. [00:32:43] And so the court separated out communications from content. And I think that's the key part here. [00:32:50] We know today, not that we've had much interpretation, but we know that content would be your photos, your videos, your messages, your emails, you know, your, your posts. Those are the content of today. And the Supreme Court definitely lays out privacy implications for content. So the question on the table I think really comes under the Carpenter extension is that is location in a geolocation application, is location content or communication? I got to think that based on the ruling of Carpenter that it is communication. But I guess we'll figure that out. [00:33:32] The second major area is third party doctrine versus modern tech. [00:33:38] You know, the whole development of technology at the very quick rate that it's occurring. [00:33:44] The traditional rule, very simple. I mean, you got to remember when our forefathers sat around at Oak Table and dealt with the issues of paper, it was actually parchment, right. And they dealt with the aspects of a person, a house, a paper, in effect, as outlined under the fourth Amendment, with a probable cause and a particularity application. It was so much different than what we're faced with today. And the question on the table is, does that data rule under the fourth Amendment, which has been around for decades, does it collapse under a digital age? And that's a, that's a real interesting legal question and boy I hope it doesn't because it's really going to make things messy if it does. [00:34:30] And then finally, the general warrants in digital form, whether bulk digital searches recreate the very abuses that the fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. And we have seen some of the courts start focusing on this. And I think it gets out to a bigger question, which is what is the definition of a search in today's world, right? Is an automated query of a database, a search or only disclosure to the police. And boy, that will, won't that, that bring up a really significant issue for us with all the data that is being collected and utilized and even the aspect of using artificial intelligence to evaluate that data. [00:35:11] So I think the, the analysis and one of the, the only thing that I can rely on is the fact that the courts have come back and said, hey, when dealing with cell phones, you got to get a little more particular here, right? You gotta tell me what you have probable. Probable cause for that directly relates to the thing that you're looking for inside the phone. You just don't get the full phone anymore. Which is a clear indication that the lower courts are thinking that the phone is so significant as to the amount of privacy that they have to pay attention to that in the analysis. So what's the bottom line as we wait for the Supreme Court ruling in this case? [00:35:47] This case is fundamentally about one thing, whether modern digital tools allow the government to search first and justify later. That's really the key is modern digital tools allow the government to search first and justify later. The court is grappling with how to adapt 18th century protections to 21st century data ecosystems. And I think that we've been waiting a long time for the beginning of this. I, I personally think that the Supreme Court is going to be very cautious because they have always been very cautious in technology and so we want to. [00:36:28] I would expect to see them. So what's my takeaway for you as I wrap up this podcast today after listening to such an amazing oral argument on a very hot topic that I encourage you again to pay attention to listen. An oral argument is just a bunch of people talking. You don't need any specialized knowledge or skill set to, to pay attention to it and to build your knowledge is power application. [00:36:53] So my, through the, through the Daigle Law Group lens, my takeaways for you in a training environment is the court is deeply concerned with two things, over breath and a lack of individualized suspicion. And we have to be careful. [00:37:10] That particularity is a key part to the Fourth Amendment of improbable cause analysis. And the one thing I do think is going to occur if you're using geofence warrants that you know. And again, I'm just spitballing here because obviously I'm going to wait for it just like you. But even if the geofence warrant survives this court case, expectations, stricter requirements on a few things, narrow tailing, probable cause, articulation, and step by step minimization, meaning that take these things in a very specific application. So I look forward to the Supreme Court's analysis. I think it's going to be a very interesting one and I definitely know that this will be a topic that will be the first of, you know, it's been since 2017 since the Supreme Court had a tech case. So I have a feeling that we knew it was coming sooner or later. It's here and I think it's going to set the stage for what's going to come next. So we will keep you updated, you know, that's for sure. So if you're if you're not getting our Dago Law Group legal updates on Tuesday, please go to the website, put your your email address in the newsletter section so that you can get our legal updates on Tuesday morning. [00:38:31] If you have not checked us out. This podcast is sponsored by the DLG Learning center where we have our 10 minute virtual legal updates video legal updates every week on court cases across the country to help you keep your knowledge ingrained. We have our supervisors continued education along with a whole library of training programs available to to you in order to maintain that knowledge base. As you listen to this, if it's piqued your attention, please pay attention to the DLG Technology Summit. You can check it out online DLG technology summit.com it is going to occur virtually in August of this year where we'll definitely hopefully have a ruling by that time and give us some something fresh, some fresh perspective in order to jump on in this analysis. [00:39:24] Hey, I appreciate you and I end as I always end in our Guardian Mindset podcast. [00:39:31] Help those who need your help, protect those who need your protection and most importantly, keep yourself and others safe. Thank you. Be well.

Other Episodes

Episode 51

January 24, 2024 00:34:39
Episode Cover

Redefining Crisis: The 'Excited Delirium' Misnomer

Episode Overview: In this episode, Attorney Eric Daigle provides a detailed exploration of "excited delirium," a term with deep roots in law enforcement and...

Listen

Episode 19

March 14, 2022 00:22:49
Episode Cover

First Amendment Auditors

A first amendment audit is a form of activism where an individual seeks to exercise their first amendment rights. In this episode, Eric reviews...

Listen

Episode 35

August 25, 2022 00:25:06
Episode Cover

Vega v. Tekoh and Miranda Rights

Eric dives into the U.S. Supreme Court's 6-3 ruling in Vega v. Tekoh. The Supreme Court held that an officer's failure to issue Miranda...

Listen